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THE CONTINUING GLOOM ABOUT FEDERAL
JUDICIAL RULEMAKING
Richard D. Freer
ABSTRACT—In 2013, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure turn seventyfive years old. The rulemaking process by which they are promulgated has
been a source of gloom for a generation. Like a wayward Hollywood star,
the process is in “crisis” and its fans are experiencing “malaise.” This
Article addresses the reasons for that gloom and concludes that some level
of crisis is inevitable. At the macro level, as Professor Redish has
emphasized, judicial rulemaking is a legislative function being performed
by an unelected body that is constitutionally empowered only to perform
the task of deciding cases and controversies. At the micro level, the Rules
Advisory Committee is subject to being second-guessed by Congress, is
plagued by uncertainty about the statutory limits of its power under the
Rules Enabling Act, and receives inconsistent signals from the Supreme
Court concerning the desirability of rulemaking versus case law
development.
These forces impel the Advisory Committee to avoid clashes with
Congress and the Supreme Court by attending to minor matters. Instead of
leading, as it is institutionally constituted to do, the Committee has become
focused on wordsmithing. The result is an unjustified barrage of trifling
changes that burden the bench and bar and squander opportunities to
address topics meaningful to the administration of justice. Ultimately, then,
the gloom attending the federal judicial rulemaking process is largely the
Committee’s fault. Like the wayward star, it should change, a process that
starts by understanding the burdens and costs imposed by every procedural
change.
AUTHOR—Robert Howell Hall Professor of Law, Emory University
School of Law. Collin Freer has discussed these issues with me for quite
some time, and I am grateful for his insights and encouragement. I also
thank Charles (“Rocky”) Rhodes, Tom Metzloff, Peter Hay, Tom Arthur,
and Bobby Ahdieh for insightful comments on an earlier draft. It is a
privilege to contribute to this Festschrift honoring Marty Redish. I am
proud to consider him my mentor and friend.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2013, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules) turn seventyfive years old. Though the Rules themselves have earned their encomia, the
process by which they are promulgated under the Rules Enabling Act
(REA)1 has been a source of gloom for more than a generation. Reading
law review commentary about federal rulemaking is like reading tabloid
headlines about a wayward Hollywood star. The favorite word, dating from
1975,2 is “crisis.”3 Like the troubled star, the civil rulemaking process has
engaged in “irresponsible experiment”4 and occasionally manifests a lack
of real-world grounding.5 Its fans suffer “malaise”6 because the process is

1

28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006).
See Jack H. Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power of the Supreme Court: A Contemporary Crisis,
27 STAN. L. REV. 673, 676 (1975).
3
See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Politics and Civil Procedure Rulemaking: Reflections on
Experience, 60 DUKE L.J. 597, 652–53 (2010); Richard Marcus, Not Dead Yet, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 299,
299 (2008) (“[C]risis clamor seems fairly universal among academics . . . .”); Cheryl L. Haas, Note,
Judicial Rulemaking: Criticisms and Cures for a System in Crisis, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 135, 149 (1995).
4
Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform: A Call for a Moratorium,
59 BROOK. L. REV. 841, 844 (1993). Specifically, Professor Burbank decried what he saw as an
“irresponsible experiment with court access” by the 1983 amendment to Rule 11. Id.
5
Professor Burbank called for a moratorium on civil rulemaking until the Advisory Committee
made provision for sufficient empirical data on which to base rule amendments. Id. at 841–42; see also
Laurens Walker, Perfecting Federal Civil Rules: A Proposal for Restricted Field Experiments, 51 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 67, 75–85 (1988).
6
Charles Alan Wright, Foreword: The Malaise of Federal Rulemaking, 14 REV. LITIG. 1, 7 (1994).
In that article, Professor Wright said he “was gloomier about the status of the rulemaking process than I
had ever been.” Id. at 9.
2
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“in disarray, if not in decline.”7 It has lost its influence as a role model,8 is
“under siege,”9 and might “go the way of the French aristocracy.”10
People are gloomy for different reasons. To some, the problem is that
the Supreme Court engages in amendment by case law instead of through
the REA process.11 Others cite the “politicization” of the process a
generation ago, which took rulemaking out of the hands of elite experts.12
Others believe the process does not take into account the sea change in the
nature of litigation from a system based upon adjudication to one based
upon settlement.13 Whatever the reasons, the sense of unease is palpable.
Even defenders are not enthusiastic. About the best one finds, reflected in
the title of an article by Professor Marcus, is that the federal rulemaking
process is “Not Dead Yet.”14
In my view, the problem is that the process, in the hands of the
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (Committee),15 is all too alive. In the
past two decades, the Committee has imposed too much new material to be
processed meaningfully or assimilated smoothly. Moreover, that period has
brought a new phenomenon: amendments that do nothing but wordsmith.16
So I am gloomy because a Committee well suited to lead and innovate on
things that matter—as it did with electronic discovery—leads infrequently
and seems to see itself as a platonic arbiter of style. It has lost the
7
Carl Tobias, Opt-Outs at the Outlaw Inn: A Report from Montana, 14 REV. LITIG. 207, 212
(1994).
8
Specifically, as a role model for state procedural provisions. See Glenn S. Koppel, Toward a New
Federalism in State Civil Justice: Developing a Uniform Code of State Civil Procedure Through a
Collaborative Rule-Making Process, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1184–88 (2005).
9
Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and
Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 888 (1999).
10
Linda S. Mullenix, Hope over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics of
Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795, 802 (1991).
11
See, e.g., Carrington, supra note 3.
12
See, e.g., Charles Gardner Geyh, Paradise Lost, Paradigm Found: Redefining the Judiciary’s
Imperiled Role in Congress, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1169, 1241 (1996) (noting that the REA
“envisioned procedural rulemaking as an essentially technical undertaking best left in the expert hands
of judges”); Mullenix, supra note 10, at 837 (“The reigning sensibility for fifty years of federal
rulemaking has been an ethos of elitism and secrecy; of closeted, deliberative efforts by a committee of
experts.”).
13
See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Making Effective Rules: The Need for Procedure Theory, 61 OKLA. L.
REV. 319, 334–37 (2008).
14
Marcus, supra note 3.
15
I limit my discussion to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
16
In his transmittal letter to the Chief Justice, the Chair of the Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure of the Judicial Conference said that the 2006 amendments to the Rules were intended to
“clarify, simplify, and modernize their expression without changing their substantive meaning.”
Memorandum from Judge David F. Levi, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the
Judicial Conference of the U.S., to the Honorable John G. Roberts, Chief Justice of the U.S. 3 (Nov.
1, 2006), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/supct1106/summary_
proposed_amend.pdf.
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opportunity, for example, to lead on the appropriate standard for pleading a
claim. Worse yet, I believe, the Committee’s hyperactive fiddling has done
harm by imposing untoward burdens on bench and bar and expenses on
litigants.
In this Article, I discuss some possible explanations for this gloomy
state. The discussion must recognize that “judicial rulemaking” engages
two levels of delegation: at the macro level, in the REA, Congress
delegates legislative power to the judiciary; at the micro level, the Supreme
Court delegates its power to the Committee. Each level raises its own
problems.
The Article proceeds in three Parts. First, at the macro level, the entire
enterprise under the REA is rife with tension concerning the roles of the
legislative and judicial branches. As Professor Redish has argued, once we
recognize that procedural rules affect the enforcement of substantive rights,
the lodging of a legislative function in the Judicial Branch raises a potential
constitutional question. So even if the Court itself actually discharged the
role of drafting proposed Rules, we should expect nervousness, if not
“crisis.” Second, at the micro level, the Committee (as delegee of a
delegee) faces at least four significant “pressure points” that render its job
especially difficult. Specifically, it must deal with (1) lack of clarity
regarding the validity of Rules under the REA, (2) congressional
intermeddling, (3) politicization of the rulemaking process, and
(4) inconsistent signals from the Supreme Court. In the aggregate, these
pressure points may explain the Committee’s recent general reluctance to
tackle major issues and its retreat to stylistic tinkering. Third, I review
some of the Committee’s specific efforts in the past generation, which
show that the Committee too often plays from behind and engages in trivial
efforts that unduly burden the profession the Committee is supposed to
serve.
THE MACRO LEVEL: THE INHERENT “CRISIS” IN FEDERAL
JUDICIAL RULEMAKING
In the REA, Congress permits the Supreme Court to promulgate rules
of procedure for the federal courts. It delegates to the Judicial Branch a
legislative function.17 The process is inherently antidemocratic because the
people responsible for this legislative product are not elected.18 It is also
I.

17

Everyone seems to agree with this point, but as my friend Tom Arthur asks, why is it up to
Congress to tell the Judicial Branch how to run its business? After all, no one has ever suggested that
the Court has the authority to write the Senate Rules. Still, the Legislature has assumed a role in setting
federal court procedure at least since the Conformity Act. Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, §§ 5–6, 17 Stat.
196, 197. That legislation instructed federal courts to employ the procedural law of the state in which
they sat.
18
See Martin H. Redish & Uma M. Amuluru, The Supreme Court, the Rules Enabling Act, and the
Politicization of the Federal Rules: Constitutional and Statutory Implications, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1303,
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inherently awkward because the Constitution authorizes the people
ostensibly performing the task19 to decide cases and controversies, and not
to draft legislation.20
The process caused few sleepless nights in the early years. When
Congress passed the REA in 1934, the prevailing jurisprudential sense
seemed to be that “substance” and “procedure” were hermetically separated
things.21 The drafters of the REA certainly understood that Congress could
not delegate to the judiciary the power to define substantive rights. Because
the REA delegated only the authority to prescribe “procedural” rules, the
thinking was, Congress retained the power to legislate on federal
“substantive” matters.22 The Court reflected this view in 1941 in Sibbach v.
Wilson & Co., which appeared to treat substance and procedure as mutually
exclusive fields.23
At some point, however, everyone recognized that there is no hermetic
seal; procedural provisions routinely affect the enforcement of substantive
rights.24 Thus, for instance, the compulsory counterclaim provision, Rule
13(a),25 has a substantive impact by precluding the assertion of a claim that
should have been filed in an earlier case. Pleading rules erect a barrier to
entry that keeps some claims out of the litigation stream altogether.
Discovery sanctions may result in the entry of default judgment against a
defendant or dismissal of a plaintiff’s claim. Rule 23 permits aggregation
of claims that may create opportunities for vindication of substantive rights
that otherwise would not exist. By permitting interlocutory review of class
action certification orders, Rule 23(f) affects the availability of the class

1303–08 (2006); see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Undemocratic Legislation, 87 YALE L.J. 1284 (1978)
(reviewing JACK B. WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES (1977)); Mullenix,
supra note 10, at 840–42.
19
The REA imposes the task on the Supreme Court. Of course, the Justices do not perform the
task, but have long delegated it to the Committee.
20
“[T]he Rules Enabling Act invests in the Supreme Court lawmaking power untied to the judicial
process.” Redish & Amuluru, supra note 18, at 1305; see id. at 1319–27 (discussing the
constitutionality of the REA).
21
Id. at 1311 (referring to the “widespread, albeit fallacious, assumption about the mutual
exclusivity between matters of procedure and matters of substance”).
22
At least after Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78–79 (1938), left nonfederal substantive
matters to the states.
23
312 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1941); see infra notes 35–42 and accompanying text.
24
“No one today could seriously doubt that procedural rulemaking involves the weighing of
substantial policy interests and dynamically alters the development of the substantive law.” Redish &
Amuluru, supra note 18, at 1319; see also infra notes 43–56 and accompanying text. This point should
have been clear when the Court decided Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc., 356 U.S.
525 (1958), although the case did not address the validity of a Federal Rule, and certainly by the time
the Court upheld Rule 4 in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 463–64 (1965).
25
All references in this paper to Rules are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
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device in federal court.26 Indeed, as Justice Scalia recognized in Shady
Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co., “most
[Federal] Rules have some effect on litigants’ substantive rights or their
ability to obtain a remedy.”27
With this realization, judicial rulemaking became considerably more
problematic. Indeed, at that point, Professor Redish argues, the REA
process became not just awkward, but unconstitutional. Because Article III
courts are politically insulated, the Constitution limits their lawmaking
authority to the adjudicatory process; federal courts are permitted to make
policy choices only in the context of resolving cases or controversies.28
Because the REA vests courts with lawmaking power of a legislative
variety and the judiciary is not responsible to the electorate, the REA,
Redish concludes, “has undermined the essence of the democratic
process.”29
This theory is bold30 and raises an existential crisis for judicial
rulemaking.31 But Professor Redish is not only admirably bold as a scholar;
he is admirably pragmatic. He recognizes that there is little chance the
Court will question the constitutionality of the REA.32 Indeed, in Shady
Grove, the Court showed no willingness to address the sorts of issues he
raised. So Professor Redish offers a strong fallback position: the Court
should recognize that the interplay of procedure and substance requires it to
put some teeth in the statutory analysis of whether Rules are valid.33 This
statutory standard—specifically, how to interpret § 2072(a) and (b)—

26

Richard D. Freer, Interlocutory Review of Class Action Certification Decisions: A Preliminary
Empirical Study of Federal and State Experience, 35 W. ST. U. L. REV. 13, 19 (2007) (finding that 52%
of cases in which courts of appeals undertook appellate review resulted in reversals of certification
orders).
27
130 S. Ct. 1431, 1445 n.10 (2010).
28
Redish & Amuluru, supra note 18, at 1305. Professor Redish recognizes that federal courts have
the authority to undertake tasks beyond adjudication. What he calls “paradigm two” activities—hiring
law clerks, holding conferences, and the like—“have no readily discernible impact on the lives of
citizens beyond the four walls of the courthouse.” Id. at 1324. On the other hand, “paradigm one”
activities consist of the judiciary’s authorized lawmaking function, which must be discharged through
the decision of cases or controversies. Id.
29
Id. at 1335.
30
Redish himself characterized the argument as “unthinkable.” Id. at 1334.
31
One way to fix the problem would be to have the Committee report to Congress, which would
then draft the Rules. Id. at 1326 (suggesting that finding the process unconstitutional “would mean,
simply, that the Rules (at least those not of the housekeeping variety) would ultimately have to come
from Congress and be signed by the President. Presumably, the Advisory Committee could still make
recommendations, but to Congress, rather than to the Court.”).
32
Id. at 1331 (“To be sure, legitimate or not, the holding of the Act’s constitutionality is not likely
to change in the foreseeable future.”).
33
Id. at 1332 (“It is conceivable, however, that a parallel subconstitutional concern about the need
for accountable policy makers should guide construction of the cryptic substance-procedure distinction
imposed by the Act itself.”).
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ultimately must guide the group that actually drafts the Rules. That group,
of course, is the Committee. We turn now to challenges it faces in doing so.
II. THE MICRO LEVEL: THE COMMITTEE FACES SIGNIFICANT
PRESSURE POINTS
In this Part, I address four things that make the Committee’s job
especially challenging and may, as a whole, cause it to shrink from
boldness. The first of these is the point just noted: that the ultimate standard
for determining whether a Rule is valid under the REA is unclear. Indeed, it
is not even clear who is in charge of determining whether the standard is
met. In addition, the Committee’s job is made more difficult by the
possibility of congressional interference, by a process that has opened the
Committee to the kind of political pressure one normally associates with a
legislative body, and by inconsistent signals from the Court about the
desirability of rulemaking versus case law development.
A. Lack of Clarity for Validity Under the REA
Federal Rules must pass muster under the Constitution and the REA.
Constitutionally, the Court has imposed a minimal requirement for validity
under Article III, augmented by the Necessary and Proper Clause. Even a
Rule that affects substantive rights is constitutional if it is “‘rationally
capable of classification’ as procedure.”34 That’s not much of a test. The
rules under scrutiny, after all, are Rules of Civil Procedure.
Does the REA raise a higher hurdle? It sets forth two requirements.
First, under § 2072(a), a Rule must deal with “practice and procedure” in
the federal courts.35 Second, under § 2072(b), a Rule “shall not abridge,
enlarge or modify any substantive right.”36 In Sibbach, the Court engaged
in double conflation: it combined the two parts of the REA into one test
and further equated it with the constitutional test. Rules 35 and 3737 were
valid under the REA for the same reason they were valid under the
Constitution: they “really regulate[] procedure,—the judicial process for
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly
administering remedy and redress.”38
The Sibbach analysis is skewed. Putting to one side whether the
constitutional and statutory tests should be coextensive, Sibbach asks only
whether a Rule is procedural. It fails to address whether the Rule modifies

34
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1442 (2010)
(quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965)).
35
28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2006).
36
Id. § 2072(b).
37
Rule 35 permits the court to order a medical examination of a party as part of discovery. Rule 37
provides methods for enforcing the discovery provisions of the Rules, including Rule 35.
38
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941).
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a substantive right. In other words, it puts all the REA eggs in the § 2072(a)
basket and gives no independent heft to § 2072(b).39 Professor Redish has
shown that this “redundancy construction” of the REA is consistent with—
indeed, explained by—the notion that there is hermetic separation between
substance and procedure.40 So at the time of Sibbach, to say that a Rule
“really regulated procedure” was to say that it could not abridge, enlarge,
or modify any substantive right. By 1965, though, when it decided Hanna
v. Plumer,41 the Court should have been willing to address the possibility (if
not the likelihood) that § 2072(b) limits § 2072(a). Surprisingly, however,
even at that late date it continued to embrace Sibbach and its conflation of
§ 2072(a) and § 2072(b).42
Later, however, in cases such as Burlington Northern Railroad v.
Woods43 and Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications
Enterprises, Inc.,44 the Court recognized that procedural provisions do
affect the enforcement of substantive rights.45 It concluded that a Rule is
valid so long as this impact on substantive rights is “incidental.”46 In 2008,
Professor Redish adumbrated a cogent approach to the question of what
this means.47 To assess whether an impact is “incidental,” Redish appealed
to the underlying purposes of the REA: (1) to ensure that Congress remains
responsible for substantive federal policy decisions and (2) to ensure a
uniform system of procedure in federal courts.48 He reasoned that Rules
may affect substantive rights in two ways. First, rulemakers may
promulgate what they think is a purely procedural provision that, in
practice, has a substantive “spillover” effect on substantive rights.49
Second, and more importantly, rulemakers draft provisions that
foreseeably—indeed, in many cases intentionally—affect substantive

39
At the time Sibbach was decided, the two provisions did not carry those subsection designations.
The operative language, however, was the same. See 28 U.S.C. § 723b (1940).
40
Martin H. Redish & Dennis Murashko, The Rules Enabling Act and the Procedural-Substantive
Tension: A Lesson in Statutory Interpretation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 26, 28–29 (2008).
41
380 U.S. 460 (1965).
42
Dean Ely noted that Sibbach recognized no independent role for § 2072(b). John Hart Ely, The
Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 724–33 (1974).
43
480 U.S. 1 (1987).
44
498 U.S. 533 (1991).
45
See generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015,
1107 (1982) (arguing that the Court was correct in not attributing independent significance to
§ 2072(b)); Ely, supra note 42, at 718.
46
“Rules which incidentally affect litigants’ substantive rights do not violate this provision
[§ 2072(b)] if reasonably necessary to maintain the integrity of that system of rules.” Burlington
Northern, 480 U.S. at 5.
47
Redish & Murashko, supra note 40.
48
Id. at 55–57.
49
Id. at 87–88.
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rights. Such provisions are valid if the “impact on substantive rights is
merely secondary to the primary procedural purpose.”50
Redish explained, for example, that Rule 37’s provision for dismissal
as a discovery sanction, which has an obvious and intended impact on
plaintiffs’ substantive rights, is valid because it is aimed primarily at
enforcing the discovery provisions of the Rules. Without such an
“instrumental use[] of substantive consequences”—without such a
“substantive club”—the discovery provisions “could not be assured of
functionality.”51
But “incidental” is not a synonym for “insignificant.” A Rule’s impact
on substantive law may be profound and yet still incidental, as
demonstrated by the example of dismissal as a discovery sanction.52 The
question is whether the “substantive club” is needed to enforce a procedural
goal. Further, in making this assessment, Redish concluded, the court
should not look to the content of the affected state law. The issue is
whether the federal provision is aimed at a procedural objective.53
Unfortunately, the Court in Burlington Northern and Business Guides
failed to engage in analysis of this sort. One reason, Redish points out, is its
unfortunate establishment of a presumption that the Federal Rules are valid.
As early as Hanna, the Court placed great importance on the fact that the
Rules go through multiple layers of review.54 Amending a Rule requires
seven steps and engages five bodies.55 In Burlington Northern, the Court
concluded that this gauntlet lends the Rules “presumptive validity” because
of the “study and approval given each proposed Rule by the Advisory
Committee, the Judicial Conference, and this Court, and the statutory
requirement that the Rule be reported to Congress for a period of review
before taking effect.”56
This presumption is unjustified for at least two reasons. One, it is not
clear that any group actually reviews the Rules for validity under the REA.
More likely, each assumes that another does the heavy lifting.57 The
Congress that passed the REA evidently assumed that the Supreme Court
50

Id. at 89.
Id. at 90–91.
52
Id. at 40–41, 80–84, 91–93.
53
Id. at 92 (“All that matters is whether the rules affect substantive rights incidentally . . . .”).
54
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965).
55
See Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1103 (2002) (explaining that a Rule proposal “undergoes at least
seven stages of formal comment and review, in a process involving five separate institutions: the
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, the
Judicial Conference of the United States, the Supreme Court, and Congress”).
56
Burlington N. R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 6 (1987).
57
See Haas, supra note 3 (“In upholding the rule [in Hanna], the Court, rather than undertaking its
own independent review, relied on the assumption that someone must have considered the rule’s
validity.”).
51
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would undertake this review.58 The Court’s assessment of the Rules,
however, is desultory at best.59 Perhaps the Justices assume that the
Committee or the Judicial Conference analyzes the provisions for validity
under the REA. One gets the picture of a pop fly falling between the
centerfielder, the shortstop, and the second baseman.
And two, presumptive validity ignores the fact that Congress’s role
here is reactive. When the Court sends a Federal Rule to Congress, it has
changed the legal status quo. As Redish says: “Congress must overcome
the serious (and intended) inertia against legislative action to alter or
supplant the Rules’ dictates.”60 In other words, if Congress does nothing, it
does something. For this reason, Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in Sibbach,
concluded that “to draw any inference of tacit approval from non-action by
Congress is to appeal to unreality.”61
The Court had the benefit of Redish’s analysis when it decided Shady
Grove in 2010. In that case, state law forbade class litigation of the
substantive claim being asserted. The question was whether a federal court
exercising diversity jurisdiction could nonetheless permit such claims to be
asserted by a class. The Court held that Rule 23 governed and permitted the
class, and that the provision is valid under the REA. It did so, however, in
two opinions: the plurality of four by Justice Scalia and the concurrence of
Justice Stevens. These opinions differed on the test for validity of a Rule
under the REA and thus left the standard in doubt.62
Though not citing the Redish article, there is much in Justice Scalia’s
opinion that is consistent with the Redish approach. Thus, a Rule is valid if
its effect on substance is “incidental,” and the court looks only to the
federal provision (not state law) in making this determination.63 Justice
Scalia did not appear to rely on the presumptive validity of the Rules. And,
58
Burbank, supra note 45, at 1137 (“[H]aving failed to address the problem at all systematically,
the [Advisory] Committee was forced, and in most cases was quite content, to rely largely on judgments
informed by a sense of the professional and political climate and by the hope that the Supreme Court
would preserve it from error.”). Professor Burbank also concluded that the original Reporter to the
Committee “was more committed to the integrity of the Rules than he was to the Act’s limitations.” Id.
at 1136.
59
See Haas, supra note 3, at 146 (“[T]he Justices, by their own admission, heavily rely upon the
advisory committee’s suggestions.”).
60
Redish & Amuluru, supra note 18, at 1326.
61
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 18 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
62
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010). The plurality,
as will be seen, adopted Sibbach. Justice Stevens embraced a more searching inquiry that would give
greater importance to § 2072(b). The four dissenters, in an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, based their
reasoning on Erie and thus did not address the validity of Rule 23 under the REA. See id. at 1460–61
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
63
Id. at 1443–44 (plurality opinion). For Justice Stevens, assessment of validity under the REA
requires consideration of the state law itself. In this regard, he undertook a functional analysis and
concluded that the New York law did not implicate substantive interests. Thus, it would be trumped by
Rule 23. Id. at 1450–60 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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notably, he forthrightly recognized that procedure can affect substance:
“The test is not whether the rule affects a litigant’s substantive rights; most
procedural rules do.”64 This recognition should undercut Sibbach, which, as
we saw, was rooted in the view that substance and procedure are mutually
exclusive. Once Justice Scalia admitted that the two overlap, it would seem
impossible for him to limit his assessment to the question of whether Rule
23 “really regulates procedure.” Indeed, Scalia seemed willing to go there.
He had addressed the distinction between § 2072(a) and § 2072(b), and
even admitted that there is tension between Sibbach and § 2072(b): “[I]t is
hard to understand how it can be determined whether a Federal Rule
‘abridges’ or ‘modifies’ substantive rights without knowing what statecreated rights would obtain if the Federal Rule did not exist.”65
Just as he was poised to engage in a meaningful analysis of whether
Rule 23 modified state law, however, Justice Scalia pulled back. To him,
Sibbach provides the sole test for validity of a Rule—under both § 2072(a)
and § 2072(b). Rule 23 concerns the aggregation of claims. It thus “really
regulates procedure” and, to Justice Scalia, is valid.66 So we are back where
we were: the test for validity of a Rule is merely whether the provision is
arguably procedural. The conclusion is jarring.67
As a policy matter, Justice Scalia defended the result because it
ensures that class action procedure will be uniform in every federal district.
If the REA required the federal court to refuse to follow a Federal Rule
when it conflicted with a law the state considered “substantive,” federal
practice would be inconsistent from district courts in one state to district
courts in another.68
No doubt this is true, and Congress did intend that practice be uniform
among the federal courts. But, that is only one policy basis for the REA. In
addition, the Act seeks to ensure that the elected branch is responsible for
making significant policy decisions.69 In Shady Grove, the defendant
argued that permitting a class action in federal court for claims that could
only be asserted individually in state court transformed the dispute from
64

Id. at 1442 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 1443 (“Each of these rules had some practical
effect on the parties’ rights . . . .”); id. at 1445 n.10 (“[M]ost Rules have some effect on litigants’
substantive rights or their ability to obtain a remedy, but that does not mean the Rule itself regulates
those rights or remedies.”).
65
Id. at 1445–46.
66
Id.
67
What Professor Redish said years before Shady Grove proved prescient: “It is as if the Court, by
relying on Sibbach, first validates the [REA] by implicitly invoking that decision’s faulty premise of
procedural-substantive mutual exclusivity . . . and, having thus found the Act constitutional, readily
acknowledges the faultiness of this essential premise.” Redish & Amuluru, supra note 18, at 1331
(footnotes omitted).
68
Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1446 (noting “the very real concern that Federal Rules which vary
from State to State would be chaos”).
69
Redish & Murashko, supra note 40, at 55–56.
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one concerning $500 to one concerning $5,000,000. The Court’s holding in
Shady Grove created litigation (and the risk of substantive liability) that
state law would not have permitted. Even if one ultimately concludes that
the impact of the federal provision is “incidental,”70 the question of whether
the result modifies a substantive right deserved the sort of hearing it gets in
Redish’s compelling book Wholesale Justice: Constitutional Democracy
and the Problem of the Class Action Lawsuit.71 The rote incantation of the
Sibbach test failed to give the argument its due.
For present purposes, it is enough to note two things about the state of
the law concerning validity of a Rule under the REA. First, because neither
the Court nor Congress undertakes a meaningful assessment of whether a
Rule is valid under the REA, it may be incumbent on the Committee to do
so. Second, doing so is difficult because the Court has failed to prescribe a
test beyond the “really regulates procedure” shibboleth of Sibbach. On the
one hand, the lack of a meaningful standard for judicial review might
counsel the Committee to be as bold as possible in promulgating new
Rules. But there are other pressure points that seem to push in the opposite
direction.
B. Congressional Action
Despite its general delegation of procedural rulemaking to the
Supreme Court, Congress continues to prescribe civil procedure. It does so
sporadically and unpredictably as the result of lobbying, and its work
product is rarely admirable.
Sometimes Congress affects procedure as part of substantive
legislation. For example, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
imposed strict pleading requirements, detailed provisions for the
appointment of lead plaintiff and counsel, and rules for overseeing
settlements in securities class actions.72 Such efforts complicate matters for
lawyers and judges, who must abide by statutory and Federal Rules
provisions. They are also antithetical to the goal of procedural consistency
across substantive areas.73

70

130 S. Ct. at 1443.
MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM
OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT (2009). The existence of the class action makes possible (if not likely)
the assertion of claims that would never have been brought otherwise. The fact that negative-value
consumer claims would not be brought individually is consistent with the maxim de minimis non curat
lex. The fact that such claims actually are asserted in class actions trumps that maxim.
72
15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1, 78u-4 (2006).
73
The Federal Rules are grounded on the notion that they apply equally to all cases; there are no
specialized rules for certain types of cases. Congress’s intervention in specific substantive areas
challenges that principle. See Mullenix, supra note 10, at 837 (noting that interest group demands for
substance-specific procedural rules threaten the goal of transsubstantivity).
71
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Sometimes Congress changes procedure in legislation that is primarily
jurisdictional. The best example is the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA).74
Though intended principally to funnel multistate class actions into federal
court, CAFA imposes several procedural requirements concerning
appointment of class counsel and awards of attorney’s fees. Though CAFA
is transsubstantive in that it applies potentially to any claim, it creates a
confusing second layer of procedural rules for bench and bar.
Occasionally, Congress intervenes directly with Rules as forwarded
from the Court. The watershed here concerned not the Civil Rules, but the
proposed Federal Rules of Evidence in 1972. Congress rejected the
proposals, took over the project, and wrote the Rules. To many, that
signaled a turning point in the relationship between the two branches and
the Court’s “monopoly” on promulgation of procedure.75
It also reflected the problems associated with permitting lobbying
regarding procedural rules. In 1988, Congress unilaterally revised Rule 35,
which permits court orders of medical examinations as part of discovery, to
include examinations by psychotherapists.76 It did so, apparently, because a
Senator’s daughter was a psychotherapist, and the Senator pushed the
amendment.77 Similarly, in 1983, Congress scuttled a proposed version of
Rule 4, which would have permitted service of process by certified mail. It
did so in response to lobbying by professional process servers.78
Occasionally, Congress has also attempted to change provisions already
promulgated, such as a 1993 effort in the House of Representatives to make
sanctions mandatory under Rule 11.79
The sense that Congress might be looking over its shoulder may
influence the Committee to eschew significant revisions. In addition, the
sort of lobbying we expect to see at Congress is now part of the process at
the Committee level as well because of the transformation of the
rulemaking process from one behind closed doors to an open one.

74

28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2006).
Geyh, supra note 12, at 1227; see id. at 1169 (“In rulemaking . . . the past twenty-five years have
witnessed a startling transformation of the judiciary’s role.”).
76
See Carrington, supra note 3, at 623 (“Congress again joined in (or intruded into) our enterprise
in 1988 by quietly enacting . . . a revision of Rule 35 authorizing mental examinations of parties by
psychologists as well as psychiatrists.”).
77
Brooke D. Coleman, Recovering Access: Rethinking the Structure of Federal Civil Rulemaking,
39 N.M. L. REV. 261, 287 n.176 (2009).
78
Bone, supra note 9, at 902–03; Mullenix, supra note 10, at 844–46.
79
Redish & Amuluru, supra note 18, at 1317. Sometimes Congress appears to resent the
Committee. “[S]ome in Congress seem anxious to rub the rulemakers’ noses in the fact of their position
of inferiority. For example, even as Rule 23(f) was headed toward implementation in 1998, bills before
Congress sought to provide virtually the same thing. And some associated with congressional activity
have bridled at awaiting or paying obeisance to the rulemaking process.” Richard L. Marcus, Reform
Through Rulemaking?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 901, 929 (2002) (footnote omitted).
75
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C. The Change to an Open Process
For the first fifty years of federal rulemaking, the Committee worked
out of the public eye. The early Committees consisted of academics and
lawyers, without judges. Meetings were closed, and comments were made
available only to those who could show a reason for access. Committees
did not publish their proceedings or drafts. By the late 1970s, membership
of the Committee had changed, and the process had become dominated by
judges.80 In 1983, the Standing Committee, reacting to the rejection of the
Evidence Rules, published what it called its “evolved practice,” which
included public hearings and publication of transcripts.81
Congress insisted on more and imposed it in the Judicial
Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988.82 That Act requires
public hearings, notice, an extended public comment period, and minutes
recording what was considered, including negative public commentary.
The result looks a good deal like agency rulemaking under the
Administrative Procedure Act.83 It changed the rulemaking process
fundamentally from one in the hands of a cadre of experts to a participatory
model.84 The most worrisome aspect of this “politicization” was opening
the Committee to lobbying. Unlike legislative lobbying, however—in
which interest groups have electoral leverage over the targets of their
efforts—members of the Committee are not running for office and need not
pander for votes. Most members are Article III judges or the only group
with a comparable form of tenure: university professors.
Notwithstanding, there is a risk that interest groups unable to persuade
the Committee will take their fight to Congress.85 This possibility may
cause the Committee to shy away from big issues. Judge Weinstein
cautioned that the Committee’s pushing too closely to the substantive side
of things would lead Congress to take over and thereby “threaten[] the
entire enterprise.”86 One former Reporter concluded that the Committee
should “listen and count the decibels,” meaning that it should not act
whenever potential revision raises substantial pushback.87 Such skittishness
80

Carrington, supra note 3, at 609.
Laurens Walker, A Comprehensive Reform for Federal Civil Rulemaking, 61 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 455, 468 (1993) (citing JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 66 (1983)).
82
Pub. L. No. 100-702, tit. IV, 102 Stat. 4642 (1988).
83
5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (2006).
84
See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, The New Order in Judicial Rulemaking, 75 JUDICATURE 161, 165–
66 (1991); Mullenix, supra note 10, at 799–800 (“[W]hat previously had gone on behind closed doors is
now open to enhanced public participation and scrutiny . . . .”).
85
This happened with the 1983 amendments to Rule 4. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
86
Marcus, supra note 79, at 930.
87
The then-Reporter urged that the Committee undertake only “sufficiently technocratic and
apolitical” amendments. Memorandum from Reporter to Civil Rules Comm. 14 (Oct. 18, 1989); see
Mullenix, supra note 10, at 836.
81
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might embolden interest groups to raise a ruckus simply to get the
Committee to forego potential changes.88
One problem with the “decibel” test is that it equates popular reaction
with important. Professor Marcus notes that several proposed amendments
have created considerable outcry while ultimately not proving to be
significant.89 More critically, the decibel test runs the risk of equating topics
that evoke substantial reaction with substantive. The fact that the
Committee must avoid substantive rulemaking does not mean that it should
shy away from important rulemaking.
Professor Carrington, who served as Reporter during implementation
of the politicized process, records that the Committee was aware that
“lobbying by the self-interested” had converted the Field Code, celebrated
for its succinctness, to the bloated Throop Code of the 1880s.90 Despite this
awareness and efforts to avoid the problem, the work product of the
Committee has come to look more like a legislative product. Rules have
gotten longer and more complex, and Committee notes look increasingly
like legislative history.91 Because it acts in the shadow of Congress—under
the threat that those it disappoints can go to the Capitol—the Committee
may have an incentive to stay away from topics that will push too many hot
buttons. Moreover, because that decisionmaking is now spread more
broadly, it may be more difficult to forge agreement regarding how to react
to Supreme Court decisions.
D. Supreme Court Action
Some criticize the Court for changing procedure by case law and not
through the rulemaking process.92 Though we may agree that rulemaking is
best done holistically, it is difficult to fault the Court for deciding cases.
That is its day job. When the Court decides a case affecting the application
of a Rule, the big question is how the Committee should react. The answer
reflects the political nature of the task because it will depend in some
measure on what one thinks of the Court’s decision as a normative matter.
We might expect that today’s more democratic, widespread process will be
less effective at forging a normative response than would a cadre of
experts.
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See Mullenix, supra note 10, at 837.
Marcus, supra note 79, at 935.
90
Carrington, supra note 3, at 616.
91
See Wright, supra note 6, at 5 n.18 (“One of the most pernicious developments in all federal
rulemaking has been the change in Advisory Committee Notes. Instead of a brief indication of the
source of a rule, as they were in the beginning, they have grown to be lengthy treatises on the subject
dealt with by the particular rule.”).
92
See, e.g., Carrington, supra note 3, at 621.
89
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Occasionally the Committee acts to “reverse” a holding. It did this
after the 1986 decision in Schiavone v. Fortune,93 in which the Court
interpreted Rule 15 to deny relation back of an amended pleading. The
result—that the plaintiff’s claim was barred—struck the then-Reporter as
antithetical to the goal of Rule 15, which is to allow relation back when the
party being added had timely notice.94 The Committee proposed an
amendment, which took effect in 1991.95
The same Reporter had a negative reaction to the Court’s 1986 trilogy
of summary judgment decisions.96 In his view, the cases permitted courts to
grant summary judgment “more freely than the text of the rule could
reasonably be said to intend.”97 This time, he was unable to persuade the
Committee to undo case law. Instead, the Committee opted to “codify” the
trilogy in an amended Rule 56. The Standing Committee rejected the effort.
The Reporter concluded that the Standing Committee did not want to
“trespass on a lawmaking role that the high Court had appropriated for
itself.”98 But there was another very good reason to reject the attempted
codification. As Professor Wright explained: There is no profit in amending
a Rule to restate (even in more elegant language) what it already is
understood to say.99
Scott v. Harris100 raises a similar issue. There, the Court held that a
videotape rendered one party’s version of the facts so improbable that the
court should have ignored that party’s affidavits in ruling on summary
judgment.101 Some observers believe that the case altered proper practice

93

477 U.S. 21 (1986).
See Carrington, supra note 3, at 619–20. The Committee also considered the holding antithetical
to the command of Rule 1, to achieve “the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 1. Though these matters seemed clear in hindsight, the Rule as promulgated was
susceptible to the interpretation in Schiavone.
95
Carrington, supra note 3, at 620 & n.100. One wonders whether the same sorts of sentiment
might lead the Committee on Appellate Rules to undo the holding in Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205,
208–13 (2007), to the effect that the time for appeal is jurisdictional and cannot be extended, even when
the defendant is not prejudiced.
96
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317
(1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
97
Carrington, supra note 3, at 645.
98
Id. at 647.
99
“The draft was an elegant one. It reflected keen insight and great drafting skill . . . . But at a time
when Rule 56 was working well, when three Supreme Court decisions had imposed an authoritative
gloss on its meaning and application, it would have been a mistake to substitute a completely new rule.”
Wright, supra note 6, at 5 (footnote omitted). Similarly, “[t]here is much to be said for sticking with a
rule that three decades of experience and precedent have made workable rather than throwing away all
the painfully accumulated learning by devising a new rule.” Id.
100
550 U.S. 372 (2007).
101
Id. at 378–81.
94

462

107:447 (2013)

Continuing Gloom

for weighing of inferences under Rule 56.102 Others, however, see the case
as an appropriate application of extant law.103 Should the Committee amend
the Rule to abrogate the holding? Should the Committee amend the Rule to
articulate the holding? When it amended Rule 56 in 2009 and 2010, it did
neither.
Indeed, usually the Committee does not react to case law. In
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.,104 the Court upheld a district court’s inherent
power to sanction lawyers and clients for abusive litigation conduct. Two
years later, the Committee amended Rule 11 to restrict sanctions available
under that provision. But the inherent power recognized in Chambers
survives and opens a door for judges unhappy with the restrictions on Rule
11 sanctions.105 The Committee has made no effort to blunt the impact of
Chambers.
The Court sends inconsistent signals about whether it prefers that
issues be addressed by Rule amendment or by case law. Sometimes it
eschews rulemaking. For example, when it decided Hickman v. Taylor,106
the case that established federal work-product practice, the Court had
before it a proposed rule dealing with the same subject. It decided the case
and rejected the Rule.107 The Court did not promulgate Rule 26(b)(3) for
more than two decades after deciding Hickman.
Sometimes the Court lets things percolate in the lower courts, as it did
with the development of mass tort class actions. The Committee notes to
the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 indicated that group’s conclusion that the
Rule 23(b)(3) class action would generally not be appropriate for such
cases.108 Through the years, however, lower courts started to certify mass
tort classes.109 The Court did not step in to stop the development. Scholarly

102

See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the
Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 838–42 (2009) (expressing concern about the
relative roles of judge and jury as fact finder).
103
See, e.g., EDWARD BRUNET & MARTIN H. REDISH, SUMMARY JUDGMENT: FEDERAL LAW AND
PRACTICE § 6:5, at 27–28 (3d ed. Supp. 2011–2012).
104
501 U.S. 32, 55–58 (1991).
105
See Wright, supra note 6, at 4 (“Many federal judges do not like the restrictions the 1993
amendments put on the power to impose Rule 11 sanctions.”); see also Thomas E. Baker, The Inherent
Power to Impose Sanctions: How a Federal Judge Is Like an 800-Pound Gorilla, 14 REV. LITIG. 195
(1994) (suggesting the use of inherent sanctions to overcome limitations imposed by Rule 11).
106
329 U.S. 495 (1947).
107
See Richard L. Marcus, The Story of Hickman: Preserving Adversarial Incentives While
Embracing Broad Discovery, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 323, 329–31 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2d
ed. 2008).
108
FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment.
109
See 7AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1783, at 325
& n.9 (3d ed. 2005) (“[O]ther courts have ignored the Advisory Committee’s doubts and have allowed
mass-disaster cases to be brought under subdivision (b)(3) . . . .” (citing cases from 1972 through
1998)).
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opinion on the issue changed.110 Eventually, the Court embraced the
application of Rule 23(b)(3) in this context.111
On other occasions, though, the Court seems to expect the Committee
to act (or at least to think about an issue). One example may be
Schiavone.112 A more interesting possibility, however, concerns pleading.
For years, commentators and courts noted that liberal pleading standards
may make it too easy to subject litigants to the costs of discovery. As
discovery became more expensive, some observers suggested that pleading
rules might be invigorated to raise the barrier to entry to the litigation
stream. Some lower courts imposed heightened pleading requirements in
some cases, particularly those asserting violations of civil rights. The Court
rebuffed these efforts and seemed to invite the Committee to get involved.
Twice within nine years—in Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics
Intelligence & Coordination Unit113 and Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.114—it
swatted back lower court efforts to raise the pleading bar. It said that any
change in pleading standards “must be obtained by the process of amending
the Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpretation.”115
Yet, aside from ineffectual tinkering with the discoverability
standard,116 the Committee did nothing. Five years after sending its second
invitation to the Committee to consider pleading standards, the Court
decided Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.117 It followed two years later with
Ashcroft v. Iqbal.118 These cases have generated a breathtaking amount of
commentary, much of it urging the Committee to undo the holdings.119
Professor Miller counsels Committee members to “determine whether they
will reassert their role as independent architects of the Federal Rules,
accept that an aspect of their responsibility now may be to codify the

110
See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein & Eileen B. Hershenov, The Effect of Equity on Mass Tort Law,
1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 269, 288 (“In the earlier 1960s we did not fully understand the implications of
mass tort demands on our legal system.”).
111
Though the Court rejected a certification class in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, it
recognized that mass torts may be amenable to class treatment. 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997) (“But the text
of the Rule does not categorically exclude mass tort cases from class certification, and District Courts,
since the late 1970’s, have been certifying such cases in increasing number.”).
112
See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
113
507 U.S. 163 (1993).
114
534 U.S. 506 (2002).
115
Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168.
116
See infra notes 149–53 and accompanying text.
117
550 U.S. 544 (2007).
118
556 U.S. 662 (2009).
119
“It would probably not be an overstatement to suggest that the combination of lower court
confusion and intense scholarly controversy caused by two Supreme Court decisions concerning the
Federal Rules over so short a time period is unprecedented.” Martin H. Redish, Pleading, Discovery,
and the Federal Rules: Exploring the Foundations of Modern Procedure, ENGAGE, Nov. 2011, at 145,
146.
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Court’s Federal Rule decisions, or simply remain silent and defer to case
development.”120
The Committee faces two questions in the wake of Twombly and
Iqbal. First, should it do anything or simply leave the matter to the Court or
Congress? Second, if it does something, should it change or embrace the
holdings? The first question implicates the decibel test. Pleadings
determine access to judicial machinery, which is obviously an issue of
political importance. One is not surprised, therefore, to see that Congress
has entertained the possibility of reacting to the cases. But one hopes it will
not. Pleadings are but one part of the overall litigation process, to be
balanced with others, such as discovery. Congress is ill suited to strike the
balance meaningfully.121 One hopes that the Committee, which is well
suited to contemplation and long-term consideration, will be the body (if
any) that deals with the matter.
The second question—what to do on the merits—has become more
interesting with the passage of time. Had the Committee leapt in based
upon early reaction to Twombly and Iqbal, it probably would have recast
Rule 8 to abrogate the holdings. Initially, few people had anything good (or
even neutral) to say about the decisions.122 Now, interestingly, scholarly
opinion has evolved. Professor Redish makes a strong argument that
Twombly and Iqbal are consistent with the notice pleading regime of Rule
8(a)(2).123 Moreover, the Court has decided more pleading cases, including
Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano124 and Skinner v. Switzer,125 which
may indicate that the sky is not falling. Courts of appeals have had a chance
to reverse improper dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6).126
120

Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 87 (2010).
121
After all, Congress delegated the job of prescribing procedure to the Court in the REA.
122
See generally Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1296 (2010)
(noting that Twombly and Iqbal have been “widely criticized as inconsistent with prior Supreme Court
decisions, contrary to the text of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and having destructive policy
consequences in terms of litigants’ access to the federal courts”).
123
Redish, supra note 119, at 150–53; see also Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel,
Rational Pleading in the Modern World of Civil Litigation: The Lessons and Public Policy Benefits of
Twombly and Iqbal, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1107, 1110 (2010) (“[L]ower courts could benefit
from a framework for determining the plausibility of a complaint.”); Adam McDonell Moline,
Comment, Nineteenth-Century-Principles for Twenty-First-Century Pleading, 60 EMORY L.J. 159, 159
(2010) (Twombly and Iqbal are “consistent with the commonsense principles that Field first articulated
in 1847 and Clark reaffirmed in 1938”).
124
131 S. Ct. 1309, 1313–14 (2011) (unanimously affirming the reversal of a dismissal of a
securities fraud case).
125
131 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2011) (reversing the affirmance of a dismissal on the pleadings). The
Court emphasized that the relevant question is not whether the plaintiff ultimately will prevail, but
simply whether he may proceed in litigation. Id. at 1296.
126
An empirical study by the Federal Judicial Center in 2011 suggests that there was no
appreciable increase from 2006 to 2010 in the rate at which cases are terminated by motions to dismiss
for failure to state a claim. Joe S. Cecil et al., Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim After
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The prudent path now, the one the Committee is following, is to see
whether a Rule amendment is required.127 The problem, of course, is that
whatever the Committee does now will be reactive. It had its chance to
lead—to respond to the Court’s invitation in Leatherman and
Swierkiewicz—but, for whatever reason, did not do so. So now, with
pleadings at least, the Committee must play from behind.
We have seen that the Committee faces definite headwinds. Some of
these may counsel it to refrain from tackling big issues. More than twenty
years ago, Professor Mullenix predicted that the politicization of judicial
rulemaking would channel that group’s efforts into noncontroversial,
largely meaningless efforts.128 I believe she was right. Nothing can be more
noncontroversial—more certain to keep Congress from second-guessing—
than tinkering with writing style. The contemporary Committee has spent
too much time doing exactly that.
III. THE COMMITTEE IN ACTION
A. Positioned for Leadership
Over the past two decades, the Committee has positioned itself well
for deep consideration of major issues. I refer to two process innovations
for which the Committee should be commended. The first relates to
empirics. In the 1990s, Professor Burbank criticized the Committee for
acting without empirical data and called for a moratorium on rulemaking
until the Committee established a mechanism for empirical consideration.129
In response, the process has changed with access to data from the Federal
Judicial Center, the Case Management/Electronic Court Filing System, and
other sources.130 Professor Marcus notes, for example, that such data
manifested “considerable support” for mandatory initial disclosures, based
upon experience under the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990.131
The second innovation is the use of a consultative method to identify
areas of potential Committee action. The Committee convenes conferences
around the country to engage discussion on various topics. This sort of
Iqbal: Report to the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules 12–16 (Mar. 2011), http://
www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/motioniqbal.pdf/$file/motioniqbal.pdf; see also Patricia W.
Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553
(2010).
127
“The Committee agreed to keep pleading topics on the agenda for continuing active study and
attention, but to continue to stay active development of specific proposals.” Civil Rules Advisory
Comm., Minutes 32 ll. 1459–1461 (Nov. 7–8, 2011), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Rulesand
Policies/rules/Minutes/CV11-2011-min.pdf.
128
Mullenix, supra note 10, at 837 (“By evading responsibility, the Advisory Committee will
become insignificant in the rulemaking process.”).
129
See Burbank, supra note 4.
130
Marcus, supra note 3, at 314.
131
Marcus, supra note 79, at 920.
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broad-based engagement ties in with the politicization of the rulemaking
process. It is less top-down than the methods used in the old days.
Innovations in case management, limitation of discovery, and initial
disclosure all found their way into the Federal Rules because of percolation
from local experience.132 And despite the politicization, one insider reports
that the Committee hearings and conferences are “relatively apolitical”133
and “probably come a good deal closer to a seminar than many hearings in
Congress.”134
In my opinion, the Committee’s signature triumph in the past decade is
the 2006 project on electronic discovery.135 This effort was energized by
these process improvements. It was at a consultative discussion on
discovery generally that the Committee became aware of concern with
electronic discovery.136 The effort also shows the advantage of taking the
lead and not playing from behind. The Committee seized e-discovery,
declared expressly that electronically stored information is discoverable,
and gave salutary guidance on how discovery of such material should be
handled.137 The effort may have averted disruptive decisions by some
courts, bringing clarity to an area about which the bar was concerned. Ediscovery shows the Committee at its best. And, like efforts in the so-called
Golden Age of rulemaking, this one has inspired action in the states.138
But there have been too few examples of such leadership. For
whatever reason, the Committee missed the chance to lead on pleadings.
And though we will never again see reform as we did with the original
Rules, which have been characterized as the “Big Bang,”139 there are plenty
of big-ticket issues the Committee could address. One is Professor Redish’s
fascinating argument that parties should not be required to pay the costs of
132

Id. at 916, 925 n.131.
Marcus, supra note 3, at 314.
134
Marcus, supra note 79, at 933.
135
Among other things, the 2006 effort amended Rule 34 expressly to recognize electronically
stored information (ESI) as discoverable matter and to permit the parties to determine the form in which
ESI would be produced. It also amended Rule 26(f) to require parties to discuss discovery of ESI in
their planning conference, changed Rule 33(d) to recognize that ESI could be provided in lieu of
interrogatory answers, and provided a safe harbor in Rule 37(f) for loss of information through the good
faith, routine operation of an electronic information system.
136
See Marcus, supra note 79, at 917–19.
137
Some have argued that discovery of ESI could have been handled by extant rules, merely by
recognizing ESI as a form of “document.” Documents have always been subject to discovery. See, e.g.,
Henry S. Noyes, Is E-Discovery So Different that It Requires New Discovery Rules? An Analysis of
Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 71 TENN. L. REV. 585 (2004). There is
something to the argument. On the other hand, the Committee’s bold leadership left no doubt on the
matter and provided meaningful guidance on how ESI should be treated in discovery.
138
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 2031.010–2031.510 (West 2007 & Supp. 2013) (Electronic
Discovery Act).
139
Marcus, supra note 3, at 300–01 (“We have all been brought up on the notion that the
procedural Big Bang happened . . . with the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”).
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complying with discovery requests.140 For the most part, though, the
Committee has not pursued such topics. Instead of using its singular
institutional advantages to think through big issues, the Committee has too
often engaged in hyperactive tinkering.
B. Much Ado About Little
As an institution, the Committee has erred in two interrelated ways
in the past two decades. First, it has imposed too much change. Second, too
many of its amendments are busywork. Indeed, much of its recent activity
is expressly aimed not at making procedure better, but at tinkering with
terminology. The Committee seems unaware that its hyperactivity imposes
significant burdens on the bench and bar and considerable expense on
litigants. The Committee’s focus on the pedantic also raises the specter of
lost opportunities. If the talent and effort invested in “restyling” each rule
in 2007 had been brought to bear on standards for pleading,142 we might
have averted Twombly and Iqbal.
The Committee’s level of activity in recent years is startling. In the
first fifty-seven years of the Rules, through 1994, the Committee
promulgated eighteen sets of amendments. This averages one set every
three years or so.143 This workload seems consistent with Judge Clark’s
early sense that “the amending process will operate with comparative
infrequency.”144 It gives lawyers, judges, and academics a chance to
respond to proposals and to digest changes.145 In the sixteen years from
1995 through 2010, in contrast, the Committee unleashed fifteen sets of
amendments.146 Of course, not all sets of amendments are equally
sweeping, but by any measure this is a remarkable amount of change for
141

140

See Martin H. Redish & Colleen McNamara, Back to the Future: Discovery Cost Allocation and
Modern Procedural Theory, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 773 (2011).
141
My criticism of the Committee is institutional, not personal. Committee members are an
impressive lot, drawn from the top of the profession.
142
See supra notes 117–26 and accompanying text.
143
Amendments were promulgated in 1946, 1948, 1951, 1961, 1963, 1966, 1967, 1970, 1971,
1972, 1980, 1982, 1983, 1985, 1987, 1988, 1991, and 1993. Historical Note, in FEDERAL RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE vii–xi (2011), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/rules/civil-procedure.
pdf.
144
Charles E. Clark, “Clarifying” Amendments to the Federal Rules?, 14 OHIO ST. L.J. 241, 242
(1953).
145
Ironically, this more leisurely pace of amendment applied when there was no provision for
public review of proposed changes. Perhaps a public process leads the Committee to conclude that it
can promulgate change more frequently. After all, the thinking might be, the profession will need less
time to adjust to changes to which it has had access throughout the pipeline.
146
Amendments were promulgated in 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003,
2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010. Historical Note, supra note 143, at xi–xii.
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the profession to absorb. We need stability in the law, including procedural
law.147
Even if all of these amendments were salutary (and they were not), this
level of activity runs the risk of fatiguing the intended audience. Lawyers
and judges who might be willing—even pleased—to read drafts and
comment on proposed changes every three or four years are less likely to
go through detailed study year after year. I have no data, but the experience
with the 2007 “restyling” project may be instructive. For that enormous
task—the only time in which every rule was amended at the same time—
two of the three scheduled public hearings were cancelled for lack of
interest.148 This fact might indicate widespread support for the project. On
the other hand, it could demonstrate that a profession then numbed by
eleven sets of amendments in twelve years had largely checked out. At
least, the Committee should be sensitive to that possibility.
Another example involves the Committee’s addressing the scope of
discoverability under Rule 26(b)(1) in the late 1990s. The Committee
reacted to widespread concern about the breadth and expense of
discovery.149 This might have been a propitious time to consider the
relationship between the pleading standard and discoverability, but the
Committee did not undertake so broad a study. Effective in 2000, the
Committee changed the discoverability standard from “relevant to the
subject matter in the pending action” to “relevant to the claim or
defense.”150 Not surprisingly, some lawyers and judges—at that point trying
to assimilate six sets of Rules amendments in six years—were wholly
unaware of the new standard.151
147

A judge who is a former member of the Committee says: “Another important interest is that of
stability. If the rules are constantly changing, the players—parties, lawyers and judges—cannot possibly
keep track of the ‘rules of the game.’” Mark R. Kravitz, To Revise, or Not to Revise: That Is the
Question, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 213, 219 (2010) (footnote omitted). In the wake of a flurry of changes to
the Appellate Rules, Professor Wright admitted: “I found it very hard to know what rule was then in
effect, or what rule was likely to be in effect in July when my book would be in print.” Wright, supra
note 6, at 9. If Charles Alan Wright had trouble, what hope is there for the rest of us?
148
Edward A. Hartnett, Against (Mere) Restyling, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 155, 155 (2006).
149
See Marcus, supra note 3, at 307–08 (discussing the context of the amendment regarding the
scope of discovery).
150
Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (1994) (amended 2000), with FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
151
In the fourth edition of our civil procedure casebook (which had a shelf life of two years
because of the restyling of every Rule in 2007), Wendy Perdue and I included an opinion from the
Northern District of Illinois ruling on a motion to compel responses to discovery. The judge applied the
old standard, “relevant to the subject matter of the action.” Anderson v. Hale, No. 00 C 2021, 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 3774, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2001) (internal quotation mark omitted). The next case in
the book was the same judge’s opinion two months later, in which he admitted that he was not aware
that the standard for discoverability had changed seven months before. Anderson v. Hale, No. 00 C
2021, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7538, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 1, 2001) (“[T]his Court erred by applying old
Rule 26(b)(1) instead of amended Rule 26(b)(1).”). He then undertook to apply the new standard. And
though the motion came out the same way, the issue had to be briefed, argued, and decided. And
litigants had to pay for all that.
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Because the change to Rule 26(b)(1) was instituted in response to
concern over the broad scope of discovery, a reasonable observer would
assume that the amendment narrowed that scope. After years of litigation,
however, it became clear that the new standard did not affect practice in
any meaningful way.152 One commentator, reacting to the bar’s worry about
the perceived constriction of discovery, concluded, “Frankly, it was not a
big deal . . . .”153
The experience with Rule 26(b)(1) points out two ways in which the
Committee seems to be out of touch. First, why would it promulgate a
change in language that was not intended to work a change in operation?
Do we want a Committee that is bent on making changes that are not “big
deal[s]”? Stated another way, if a rule amendment is not a big deal, why
should it be made? I am not saying that every change to the Rules must be
epochal. But why bother making a change that does nothing?
Second, the amendment to Rule 26(b)(1) was indeed a big deal
because (busy) real-world lawyers and (busy) real-world judges had to
litigate and determine its meaning. And real-world parties had to pay for
that litigation. As it turns out, every motion to compel that questioned the
scope of the new rule was a waste of human capital and money. At the end
of the day, no change was wrought. The profession would have been better
off if the Committee had done nothing.
In contrast to the amendment to Rule 26(b)(1)—which may have been
intended to result in change but in application did not—the past two
decades have seen something new: amendments in which the Committee
aspires to nothing more than wordsmithing. In 1991, the Committee
amended Rule 50(a) to jettison “directed verdict” in favor of the hardly
mellifluous “motion for judgment as a matter of law.”154 Judges and
lawyers had been using “directed verdict” for centuries. There was no
confusion in the profession about what the phrase meant or how the motion
worked. The Committee felt, however, that the new phrase more accurately
describes what a judge actually does when she grants such a motion.
This wholly stylistic change imposed costs of which the Committee
seems unaware.155 As a minor example, form files using “directed verdict”
were rendered obsolete. More importantly, lawyers now were expected to
use different terminology for the same motion in federal and state court.
These may be small costs, but does the imposition of the Committee’s
stylistic ideal justify imposing them?
152

See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., A Square Peg in a Round Hole? The 2000 Limitation on the Scope of
Federal Civil Discovery, 69 TENN. L. REV. 13, 24–27 (2001).
153
Marcus, supra note 3, at 307.
154
At the same time, the familiar “motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict” in Rule 50(b)
was changed to the “renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law.”
155
See, e.g., Stephen C. Yeazell, Judging Rules, Ruling Judges, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 229,
231 (1998) (noting a disconnect between judges, who dominate rulemaking, and practicing lawyers).
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The absurdity of the exercise is demonstrated by the fact that now—
over twenty years later—lawyers and judges still routinely use the phrase
“directed verdict.”156 As a leading treatise says, “[T]he old term is so
convenient, and appears so often in the cases and the literature, that it is
still used here.”157 So what possible profit was there in the exercise?
The experience with Rule 50 suggests that the Committee learned
nothing from its 1966 amendment of Rule 19, which addresses the joinder
of what lawyers have always called “necessary” parties. Concerned that the
term “necessary” had become talismanic, the Committee deleted it from
Rule 19 when it established its functional analysis in 1966.158 But it
substituted the cumbersome phrase “needed for just adjudication.” Not
surprisingly, everyone continued to say “necessary.” Over four decades
later, the Committee replaced “needed for just adjudication” with
“required.” Predictably, though, everybody still says “necessary.” In the
final analysis, the change of terminology accomplished nothing.
The Committee structure probably contributes to hyperactivity. Any
standing committee is probably under pressure to justify its existence. The
problem is especially acute when members serve limited terms. No one
wants to say, “I served on the Committee and during my years it sent forth
no amended rules.” But the Committee does not exist for members’
professional gratification. It exists to serve the profession. Every
amendment, no matter how small, imposes costs. Judges and lawyers must
study each new version of a rule. This takes time and effort. The burden
should not be imposed too often or for trivialities.
Moreover, all change runs the risk of unintended consequence and
error. When it tinkered with Rule 50 to adopt its stylistic preference, the
Committee inadvertently removed the provision that allowed plaintiffs to
make the motion and also omitted any reference to a motion for partial
judgment.159 This led to two years of uncertainty about the scope of the new
rule before another amendment fixed the problems.160 This unnecessary
156

See, e.g., Gregg v. Ham, 678 F.3d 333, 338 (4th Cir. 2012) (“The district court granted the
defendants’ motion for a directed verdict on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.”).
157
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 94, at 671 (7th ed.
2011).
158
The amendments to Rule 19 were part of a systematic overhaul of that provision and Rule 23,
concerning class actions, and Rule 24, concerning intervention. There is considerable overlap among
those Rules, as each addresses the potential harm to the interest of an absentee who is not joined in a
pending case. In reaction to what had become a “jurisprudence of labels,” id. § 70, at 495, the 1966
amendments set forth pragmatic factors justifying the overruling of plaintiff’s party structure of a case,
see generally Richard D. Freer, Rethinking Compulsory Joinder: A Proposal to Restructure Federal
Rule 19, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1061, 1075–88 (1985). As a small part of these changes, the Committee
deleted “necessary” from Rule 19(a).
159
See Michael J. Waggoner, New Rule 50 May End Directed Verdicts for Plaintiffs, 22 SW. U. L.
REV. 389, 389–90 (1993).
160
See generally WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 157, § 94, at 671 n.7 (collecting cases and scholarly
authority).
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thrashing was necessitated by the Committee’s original attempt to fix a
problem that did not exist.
The archetype of stylistic tinkering is the restyling project, which went
into effect in 2007. This massive effort, involving thousands of person
hours, amended every Federal Rule and the subnumbering of most. The
goal was to make the Rules more readily understood. I favor most efforts at
plain language. They make sense, for instance, with jury instructions,
which must be divined by lay people. But lay people do not use the Federal
Rules. Professionals use them and invest a great deal of time and effort to
understand them. Along the way, they become facile with the provisions’
terminology and numbering.161
As a result of the restyling, lawyers and judges accustomed to certain
language and subsection numbers and letters were required to consult the
new provisions to see the new language and the new subsectioning. Every
form file in every law firm for every motion in federal court was rendered
obsolete. And the restyling ensured that every federal rule would be
worded differently from its corresponding state rule.
Every page dealing with the language of every rule in treatises such as
Moore’s Federal Practice and Wright and Miller’s Federal Practice and
Procedure had to be changed. The authors of every civil procedure
casebook and hornbook had to publish new editions to track the new
language. Real-world people—lawyers, law students, and clients—had to
pay for those new books. And the cost in human capital is remarkable.
Countless people spent countless hours changing references from Rule
19(a)(2)(i) to Rule 19(a)(1)(B)(i), making sure that discussions of
compulsory counterclaims cited Rule 13(a)(1) instead of Rule 13(a), and
the like. Hardly rewarding or productive labor.
Consider too the impact on legal research. For instance, the restyling
changed “cross-claim” with a hyphen to “crossclaim” without a hyphen.162
An electronic search for the phrase with the hyphen will not pick up cases
using the phrase without the hyphen, and vice versa.163 So lawyers
searching the case law must know that the phrase was previously
hyphenated and run searches to account for that. Those seeking cases about
joinder of proper plaintiffs will need to know that what today is Rule
20(a)(1) was until 2007 simply Rule 20(a). Someone in the real world must
pay for all those searches.
161
Defenders of the Rules as restyled in 2007 invariably argue that the new product reads much
more clearly than the old. That would carry more force if every lawyer and judge in practice when the
new Rules went into effect had retired the day before. But they didn’t and so must relearn new language
for what they have already learned.
162
FED. R. CIV. P. 13(g).
163
For example, on November 2, 2012, a Lexis search of the federal courts library for “cross-claim
and date (is 2012)” yielded 931 cases, while a search for “crossclaim and date (is 2012)” yielded 417
cases.
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These burdens are all the more astounding when we remember that the
purpose of restyling was to “clarify, simplify, and modernize their
expression without changing their substantive meaning.” The restyling
project, like the amendment to rid us of the phrase “directed verdict,” is
part of a new phenomenon: changes to procedural rules that do not change
procedure.164 So all this effort and expense was incurred notwithstanding
that the outcome of every motion in the federal courts should be unaffected.
Of course, there is something unreal about saying that. It is hard to
imagine that the legal profession, based as it is upon language, will simply
accept without question that massive linguistic changes are to have no
meaning. So it will come as no surprise that the restyled Rules will create
litigation and uncertainty.
Meaningless change and imposition of burden continue. Rule 56, as
we discussed, remained unchanged even in the wake of the Court’s trilogy
of summary judgment cases in 1986.165 But that Rule has proven less hardy
recently. In 2007, it got its facelift in the restyling project. Part of that effort
changed the language that the court “shall” grant a motion under certain
circumstances to language that the court “should” grant the motion. In
2009, the Committee changed “should” back to “shall.” In 2010, it
amended the Rule again to change timing. Through its three amendments in
four years, the standard for granting the motion bounced from the third
sentence of Rule 56(c) to the second sentence of Rule 56(a). Even the
Committee seemed embarrassed by this level of tinkering.166 Of course, it
was not so embarrassed that it could restrain itself.
CONCLUSION
For at least a generation, commentary on federal judicial rulemaking
has been gloomy. The process, like the wayward Hollywood star, has
inspired words like “crisis” and “malaise” and “decline.” Some of the
problem is inevitable. At the macro level, the REA raises profound issues
of separation of powers, as Professor Redish has written compellingly.
Even at the micro level, structural components ensure difficulties: the
Committee is subject to lobbying, and Congress may always look over the
Committee’s shoulder when a constituency convinces it to. Moreover, the
Court occasionally sends the Committee a clear message. Usually,
however, it does not, and the Committee must decide whether a particular
area is better suited to rulemaking or to case development.
164

See Hartnett, supra note 148, at 156 (arguing that restyled Rules “do not seek to create a better
procedure”).
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See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
166
“There are constant complaints that the rules are changed too often. Acting one year later to
retract amendments the bar has barely had time to master will add support for these complaints.” Civil
Rules Advisory Comm., Draft Minutes 5 ll. 206–208 (Apr. 20–21, 2009), http://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV05-2009.pdf.
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But the Committee is to blame for much of the troubled state. A group
capable of leadership on significant issues has too often failed to lead. It
has contented itself to splash in the shallow water and, through its
hyperactivity, risks becoming more of a bother than a meaningful force. No
one cares what the Committee’s stylistic preferences are. They do not
matter, and the Committee should not force busy people to do a lot of busy
work to accommodate them. A Committee that focuses on pedantry sends
the message that pedantry is its highest calling.
Like the wayward star, the Committee can change. Part of this process
is an appreciation that every amendment to a Rule imposes costs and
burdens on very busy people. This should lead to a reduction in the number
of amendments promulgated. And this should lead to a focus on things that
matter. If the effort put into changing “shall” to “must” and “Rule 13(a)” to
“Rule 13(a)(1)” and deleting “indispensable” had been spent on something
that would improve the administration of justice, the gloom would
dissipate. We might be reading articles about rulemaking that featured
“triumph” instead of “crisis.”
Again, not every amendment will be transformative. There are
technical things to be fixed from time to time. But every amendment should
be calibrated to accomplish something for judges, lawyers, and litigants
that justifies the cost and burden it imposes on them.
Amendments to the Federal Rules should be like faculty meetings: rare
and purposeful.
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